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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the structure and attributes of the terrorist network that was 
responsible for the 2004 Madrid bombing attack. It initially produces a Baseline 
computational model using POW-ER, based on data from academic papers and news 
articles about the 2004 Madrid bombings. The Baseline model is further compared with 
two different representations of the same terrorist group: 1) the Expert model, which is 
identical to the Baseline model except for the fact that the actors have high application 
experience and skill levels, and 2) the Hierarchical model, which is similar to the 
Baseline but with a hierarchical structure. All models are tested under both baseline and 
high counterterrorist conditions. This thesis examines how different contingency factors 
affect the preparation and execution of a terrorist bombing attack and provides 
recommendations to inform counterterrorist agencies.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the premier issues facing governments today is terrorist networks. These 
networks must be understood in order to apply effective policies and practices to 
safeguard citizens, assets, and interests. For decades, terrorist cells have relied on the 
support provided by structured organizations like Al Qaeda for their funding, planning 
and execution of attacks (Benjamin & Simon, 2005). However, recent large-scale terrorist 
acts, like the Madrid bombings in 2004 or the London bombings in 2005, strengthen the 
view that terrorist cells operate in a self-organized manner (Benjamin & Simon, 2005; 
Bell, 2002).  
On Thursday, March 11, 2004 at 0639 GMT, within a three-minute time frame, 
ten bombs exploded on four trains in three stations in Madrid, Spain (BBC News, March 
12, 2004). This attack killed 191 people and wounded 1800 more (Jordan & Wesley, 
2006). The attack occurred three days before the general elections. Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna (ETA), a terrorist group that has performed many terrorist attacks on Spanish 
soil since it was founded in 1959, was blamed by the Popular Party’s Prime Minister José 
Mariá Aznar for being responsible for these attacks, even though early findings suggested 
that ETA’s “methods” did not match with those used by the terrorists who had performed 
the 2004 Madrid bombings.  
After a few days, it became clear from the emerging evidence that a Jihadi 
terrorist group was responsible for the attacks (Benjamin & Simon, 2005; Wright, 2004). 
The Spaniards were angry with the Popular Party, both for insisting that ETA was 
involved in the attacks and for sending Spanish troops to Iraq despite the public’s 
negative opinion of this act. The terrorists who had performed the attacks demanded the 
removal of Spanish troops from Iraq. The Socialist Party, which had been promising the 
removal of troops from Iraq in its recent campaign, was elected at the general elections 
on March 14, 2004, and Spain withdrew its troops from Iraq (Benjamin & Simon, 2005). 
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Many academics and practitioners have suggested counterterrorist policies that 
could be adopted by governments. Bell (2002) writes that thwarting terrorism requires a 
policy that focuses on the idea that, because terrorism relies on commitment, “loss of 
faith, the imposition of reality, and changing times can erode its strength.” Changes in the 
Islamic population’s ideological and cultural beliefs about Western culture may diminish 
the motivation of people to join terrorist groups. This change of ideology may be 
achieved by developing a higher standard of living in regions that “generate” terrorists 
(Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006). 
Loss of faith and imposition of reality are two issues that require time. The near 
term issue that arises is how terrorist networks can be understood and more effectively 
thwarted until Bell’s policy reaches its goal? 
Network theory, a branch of complexity theory, tries to explain the various types 
of systems that emerge in the real world. It is based on mathematical graph theory. 
Networks can be divided into four components: social (among people or groups of 
people), information or knowledge (such as the network of citations among academic 
papers), technological (such as the electric power grid) and biological (such as DNA) 
(Newman, 2003).  
In order to understand terrorist networks, many analysts use the Social Network 
Analysis approach (Hassan, 2007; Mccartan et al., 2008; Magouirk et al., 2008; Jordan et 
al., 2008). Social Network Analysis examines the connections and interactions among 
individuals or groups based on common patterns of friendship, occupation, ethnicity, or 
any other pattern that is of interest to the researcher (Newman, 2003). Hence, terrorist 
networks are analyzed in terms of variables such as strong and weak ties, and density 
among the participants or groups that constitute the network.  
Traditional social network studies often have been criticized for inaccuracy and 
subjectivity (Newman, 2003). Even though many of these studies follow a backwards 
approach (Burton, 2003) after the events under examination have occurred (Hassan 2007; 
Mccartan et al., 2008; Jordan et al., 2008), the created networks may be inaccurate 
because of vital data missing from the researcher’s database. The reasons for this missing 
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data could be because some information was confidential, some information never was 
publicly released, or because the network included participants who were not considered 
to be a part of this network. Of course, many social network analysis papers take these 
considerations into account (Mccartan et al., 2008; Jordan et al., 2008). Moreover, Social 
Network Analysis does not examine the structure or the workflow of a network for 
specific activities (e.g., a bombing attack) or the types of interdependencies (pooled, 
sequential, and reciprocal (Thompson, 1967) that exist among the tasks.  
According to Simon (1993) and Epstein (1999), emerging virtual environments 
based on computational models can imitate actions and behaviors observed in the real 
world. It must be kept in mind that “we do not have to know, or guess at, all the internal 
structure of the system but only that of it that is crucial to the abstraction” (Simon, 1996). 
Conceptual Simulation Models have been used to represent terrorist networks as a 
business process and provide insights to counterterrorism policy makers (Nissen & 
Leweling, 2007). These computer-based models analyze terrorist networks primarily 
through the lens of contingency theory using Agent Based Modeling techniques.  
The examination of terrorist networks from an organizational point of view has 
been criticized because terrorist networks cannot be seen as a part of a larger terrorist 
network; they operate in a self-organizing way and the network’s participants constantly 
change (Bell, 2002; Benjamin & Simon, 2005). However, locally autonomous terrorist 
groups that are task oriented meet Galbraith’s (1977) definition of organization: they are 
composed of groups of people in order to achieve their purpose (the terrorist attack) 
through a division of labor among the network’s participants. These groups are integrated 
by information-based decision processes that are continuously performed by the 
network’s participants. Sequential tasks are performed as in a typical assembly line. The 
output of task A is the input of task B, where task A is B’s preceding task. Although task 
B depends on task A, task A is not dependent on task B. Reciprocally interdependent 
tasks are performed together, and the output of a task becomes the input of another task 
and vice versa (Thompson, 1967). For example, a terrorist attack can be divided into 
distinct sequential tasks (e.g., plan, finance, assemble the explosives, train, and execute) 
but some tasks are also reciprocally interdependent (e.g., the planning and financing 
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phases of a terrorist attack, after a certain point, are performed together and a change of 
the output of one task directly affects the input of the other). Bell’s (2002) view of locally 
autonomous terrorist networks works in organization theory because “organizations seek 
to place reciprocally interdependent positions tangent to one another, in common group 
which is (a) local and (b) conditionally autonomous” (Thompson, 1967). 
Tasks that require reciprocal interdependence need to be coordinated mutually by 
the participating members. The required amount of coordination among the members of 
terrorist networks is largely due to the low level of experience among their members (the 
Madrid terrorist cell) and the complexity involved in performing a terrorist act under 
secrecy. As a result, the members of terrorist networks rely on project grouping to 
accomplish the required coordination (Thompson, 1967). 
This thesis examines the structure and attributes of the terrorist network 
responsible for the bombing attack that occurred in Madrid on March 11, 2004. The 
intent is to represent the terrorist network responsible for the Madrid Attack and examine 
the key attributes of this network. Emphasis is placed on the actors’ roles, which will be 
examined with the use of computer simulation. The data set is drawn from many 
academic papers and news articles that analyze or describe this specific event. This thesis 
focuses on the exploration of the structural and task dynamics of the network using Agent 
Based Modeling (Epstein & Axtell, 1996; Miller & Page, 2007). The research question is: 
How do different contingency factors affect the preparation and execution of a terrorist 
bombing attack? These contingency factors are the structural configuration of the terrorist 
network, the environmental ambiguity and complexity, and the members’ skill level. The 
selection of the case study approach is based on the research question. According to Yin 
(2002), a case study is appropriate when “a ‘how’ or a ‘why’ question is been asked 
about a contemporary set of events, over which the investigator has little or no control.”  
This thesis produces a computational model using Agent Based Modeling 
software POW-ER v.3.5b, which imitates the structure and the workflow of the terrorist 
network before the attack (Baseline model). A cross comparison of the generated 
computer model with Social Network Analysis representations that describe the Madrid 
attack and the existing datasets is made in order to evaluate the validity of the model. 
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Hence, keeping a balanced level of realism in the construction of the computational 
model, this thesis examines and analyzes the process of the Madrid terrorist attack, 
suggesting counterterrorism policies. 
Sensitivity analysis of the computational model can identify those “parameters 
and relationships to which the behavior and policy recommendations are sensitive” 
(Sterman, 2000). According to Galbraith (1977), a low level of formalization can handle 
high uncertainty. In addition, experienced workers produce fewer exceptions than 
inexperienced ones in unstable environments. The Madrid terrorist network had low 
formalization and centralization (Benjamin & Simon, 2005) and the members’ skill level 
was low. According to Haahr-Escolano (2005), the members of the 2004 Madrid cell 
were “amateurs.” In addition, the Madrid network was highly decentralized (Benjamin & 
Simon, 2005). Galbraith (1977) proposed that, when the tasks performed by a 
hierarchical organization become complex and unpredictable, then senior managers are 
overloaded with exceptions. An exception occurs when there is lack of information at the 
responsible node to accomplish a task. Therefore, this thesis compares the Baseline 
model with both an “Expert” model, which is the same as the baseline model with the 
difference that its members have high skill and application experience levels, and with a 
“Hierarchical” model, which was built based on the Baseline model, under different 
counterterrorist environments. According to Burton & Obel (1995), computational 
models can be used to examine “what is,” “what if,” and “what should be” questions. 
This thesis initially examines the “what is” question with the baseline model based on 
archival data about the 2004 Madrid bombings, and afterward compares the Baseline 
model with the two other hypothetical models in order to test the “what if” question. This 
approach is used in order to examine how different contingency factors affect the 
preparation and execution of a terrorist bombing attack, which is the research question of 
this thesis. The results of these comparisons also suggest potential policies and actions 
that could slow down or disrupt terrorist networks. This thesis also shows how a 
computational modeling technique like Agent Based Modeling is able to examine 
specific terrorist attacks, and provide counterterrorist recommendations using real world 
data.  
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The second chapter covers the theoretical background on Network Theory, 
Organization Design, and Computer Simulation. The next chapter covers the case study 
of the 2004 Madrid bombings. The fourth chapter covers the research design of the thesis. 
The fifth chapter has the results of the various simulations and comparative presentations 
of the findings. The last chapter covers the findings, the limitations of this thesis, 
suggests counterterrorism policies, and indicates potential venues for future research.  
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II. BACKGROUND  
This section initially examines terrorism in general, and it covers some additional 
background about the way it is viewed in the information age. Then it analyzes the Social 
Network Analysis (SNA) technique that is used by scholars and practitioners in order to 
analyze terrorist networks. SNA is a branch of network theory that has its roots in graph 
theory from mathematics, so a brief description of network theory also is provided. The 
purpose of this thesis is to examine the process and the contingency factors that affect the 
development of a terrorist bombing “project,” using existing data from the March 11, 
2004 Madrid bombings. This examination is performed with the use of computational 
models, so a brief description of computational organization theory is provided.  
A. TERRORISM AS A FORM OF WARFARE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
Many scholars have defined terrorism, and its definition has been a point of 
contention within academia. The difficulty with terrorism is that, even though it is an 
“ism” (like communism, capitalism or even postmodernism), it does not represent an 
ideological, political or cultural category. Terrorism is a tactic where fear is the dominant 
key element. Other key elements of terrorism are the use of violence, the symbolic use of 
victims, the absence of moral constraint, advanced planning and operational seriality 
(Robb, 2007).  
Terrorism is a tactic, and tactics are parts of warfare. According to Robb (2007), 
there are four generations of warfare. The first two generations of warfare (Mass and 
Industrial) are considered as conventional warfare, and the second two generations 
(Blitzkrieg & Guerilla) as unconventional warfare. Conventional warfare is the type of 
warfare that is fought between nations, where the conflict takes place among well-
structured armies following tactics and procedures. In conventional warfare, armies 
traditionally target only what is of military interest. In contrast to conventional warfare, 
unconventional warfare uses indirect opposition tactics and is based on surprise and low 
intensity conflicts. In unconventional warfare, civilians and noncombatant infrastructures  
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may be targeted on purpose by the opposing groups. A commonly used method is the 
“system disruption method,” which is a simple way of attacking the critical networks 
(electricity, oil, gas, water and communications) that underpin social life.  
Terrorism could fit in the fourth generation of warfare (guerilla warfare), since it 
has many elements in common. On the other hand, terrorism has some critical differences 
with guerilla warfare that make it distinct. Guerillas use terror to influence the 
noncombatant population, and their tactics are similar to the ones used by terrorists. The 
differences with guerilla warfare are the following: (a) terrorist groups operate globally 
and are not limited within the borders of a particular country like guerillas; and (b) a 
guerrilla tries to destabilize a particular state, but terrorism has as a goal to destabilize a 
series of countries, mainly the Western ones (Wright, 2004). In addition, terrorism 
operates in both the physical and information domain, while guerillas operate mainly in 
the physical domain (Robb, 2007). Hence, terrorism is a distinct form of warfare. 
Therefore, like any “age,” the information age has its own form of war (Arquilla, 1996).  
Al Qaeda (AQ) is the largest terrorist organization with multiple cells and 
affiliates in existence and has been responsible for major terrorist attacks (New York, 
2001, Bali, 2002, Madrid, 2004, London, 2005). It was founded after the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan as an anti-Soviet resistance organization. At that time, it was an army of 
Arab warriors who entered the war in order to help the Afghans fight the Soviets, and it 
was known to the world as the anti-Soviet jihad (Napoleoni, 2005).  
There are two kinds of jihad: defensive and offensive. The defensive jihad is 
about taking up arms in order to protect Islam, and the offensive one is about taking up 
arms for spreading Islam. In order to perform offensive jihad, the emir or caliph of the 
community should call for arms and it is then the duty of all Muslims to join him. Osama 
Bin Laden and other leaders of Islamic organizations like Al Zarqawi (Napoleoni, 2005) 
took the emir’s role in Al Qaeda. Blind terrorist hits have been made in the name of jihad, 
including the March 11, 2004 Madrid bombing attacks (Wright, 2004; Benjamin & 
Simon, 2005). 
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After the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, AQ remained active, and was 
transformed into a terrorist organization. The anti-Soviet jihad was transformed by its 
leaders into an anti-colonization jihad. The organization configuration of Al Qaeda in the 
late 1990s was bureaucratic (Mintzberg, 1980), and was commonly referred to as a 
hierarchy (Benjamin & Simon, 2005). The organization was established in Afghanistan 
and had its training camps across the country. Al Qaeda’s leader was Osama Bin Laden, 
and beneath him, there was a clear hierarchical structure.  
After 9/11 and the beginnings of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, AQ 
decentralized and its cells were spread across the world, enforcing the existing ones or 
creating new ones. AQ is a network of networks. Small terrorist organizations that 
operate in various countries are interconnected into a larger network that forms the Al 
Qaeda organization (Benjamin & Simon, 2005).The structure of this terrorist network is 
not hierarchical or close to any of Mintzberg’s organizational configurations (Bell, 2002). 
Al Qaeda’s new organizational configuration can be characterized as an Edge 
organization (Alberts & Hayes, 2003). The Al Qaeda network contains decentralized 
teams that operate within complex environments with great agility and adapt to the 
emerging interchanging conditions. The leader of Al Qaeda is still Osama Bin Laden, but 
his role is more ideological and is accomplished by spreading videos and declarations; he 
has no managerial role in coordinating the existing terrorist branches of Al Qaeda 
(Wright, 2004; Wiemann, 2006).  
According to Robb (2006), each state’s goal is to control the economy, resources, 
laws, infrastructure, education and health of its citizens. Terrorists’ desire is a failed state. 
They believe that, if the state fails, they win. Moreover, technology is advancing rapidly, 
providing power to non-state actors, and this growth strengthens the ability of groups to 
use decentralized technological tools in order to attack a state. The Global War on Terror 
(GWOT) is a decentralized war where small groups have a dominant role.  
B. NETWORK THEORY AND SOCIAL NETWORKS 
In order to thwart terrorism groups, many researchers and practitioners analyze 
the structure of terrorist networks using Social Network Analysis (SNA), a technique that 
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is based on network theory (Magouirk et al., 2008; Jordan et al., 2008). SNA deals with 
the analysis of the structure of social networks. A network is a set of nodes that are 
interconnected in a specific way with links. Links represent a relation between two nodes 
that is based on some common characteristic (Newman, 2003). For example, links in 
social networks can be family relations, friendship ties or education ties. As was 
mentioned in Chapter I, networks can be divided into social (among people or groups of 
people), information or knowledge (such as the network of citations among academic 
papers), technological (such as the electric power grid) and biological networks (such as 
DNA) (Newman, 2003). 
Network theory suggests three main categories of networks based on their 
behavior and structure. Random networks are the networks that are created by luck rather 
than design (Atkinson & Moffat, 2005). Scale free networks are networks, like the 
internet, where the hubs (nodes with a large number of links) are more likely to attract 
new nodes than the nodes with fewer links (Newman, 2003). These networks seem to 
follow the 80/20 rule, which indicates that 80 % of the network’s total number of links 
are connected to a small number of nodes (Barabási, 2002). Small world networks are the 
networks where each node is connected with any other node in the network by a short 
path (Newman, 2003). The difference between random and small world networks is that 
the average path length (the average distance between a random pair of nodes) is smaller, 
and the clustering coefficient (how tightly the nodes are interconnected locally) is higher 
in small world networks (Atkinson & Moffat, 2005).  
Granovetter (1973) suggested the existence of strong and weak ties within social 
networks. Strong ties create small worlds (clutters of nodes highly interconnected), and 
weak ties are the “bridges” among various small worlds. A study conducted by Milgram 
and Travers in 1969 was the first experimentation on social small world networks. The 
researchers asked 300 residents of Nebraska, USA to send a letter to a person who lived 
in Boston, Massachusetts, USA by way of acquaintances. A sender’s friend was regarded 
as a first degree of separation, a friend’s friend as a second and so on. This experiment 
showed that there were about six degrees of separation on average between the senders  
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and the recipient, meaning that there was a short path connecting every pair. This study 
has been repeated with instant messages with millions of participants in 2008 and showed 
results similar to Milgram’s study (Yahoo News, August 4, 2008).  
Social Network Analysis analyzes real world social networks based on the 
concept of small worlds. This technique examines the connections and interactions 
among individuals or groups based on common patterns of friendship, occupation, 
ethnicity, or any other pattern that is of interest to the researcher (Newman, 2003). The 
Social Network Analysis approach has been used for the study of terrorist networks 
(Hassan, 2007; Mccartan et al., 2008; Magouirk et al., 2008; Jordan et al., 2008). Hence, 
terrorist networks are analyzed in terms of variables like centrality (a high number of 
links constitute a central node or hub), path length (the average distance between a 
random couple of nodes) and the clustering coefficient (how tightly the nodes are 
interconnected locally).  
Most academic papers that use SNA to examine terrorist networks focus on case 
studies that examine specific terrorist events, or explore the evolution of a terrorist 
network using archival data. In order to perform this analysis, the researcher ideally is 
fully aware of the participants of the network and their in-between relations. However, 
the researcher’s dataset might miss vital information due to the existence of classified 
information or due to incomplete awareness of the complete network. Traditional social 
network studies have often been criticized for inaccuracy and subjectivity for the reasons 
mentioned above (Newman, 2003). Another limitation of SNA is that it focuses mainly 
on the participants and their connections, and not on the process participants perform 
their assigned tasks.  
C. THE ORGANIZATIONAL VIEW OF TERRORIST NETWORKS 
According to Benjamin & Simon (2005) and Bell (2002), terrorist cells cannot be 
seen as a part of a larger terrorist network like Al Qaeda because they operate locally and 
autonomously and the network’s participants constantly change. In order to approach 
terrorist cells from an organizational view point, the locally autonomous terrorist cell can 
be considered as an organization for a short period of time when the examined network 
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performs a specific project (i.e., executes an attack). This approach examines terrorist 
cells at the group level of analysis for a short period of time, minimizing the fluidal 
participation that occurs within terrorist networks. 
According to Galbraith (1977), “organizations are 1) composed of people and 
groups of people 2) in order to achieve some shared purpose 3) through a division of 
labor 4) integrated by information-based decision processes 5) continuously through 
time.” The terrorist network responsible for the March 11, 2004 Madrid attacks can be 
identified as an organization because: 
• The terrorist cell was composed of different individuals and groups of 
people (like the Spaniards who provided the explosives or the Moroccan 
drug smugglers who financed the attack); 
• All group members operated for a specific purpose (the bombing attacks 
three days before the general Spanish elections); 
• The group members performed different tasks, such as planning the 
attacks, training for the attacks, assembling the explosives and performing 
the attacks. The division of labor does not imply that every member did 
only one task during the bombing preparation and execution process. 
Some members participated in multiple tasks before the Madrid attacks 
(Haahr-Escolano, 2005); 
• The communication among the terrorist members was achieved with the 
use of cell phones or occurred when they met in specific places (a safe 
house outside Madrid and a phone shop that was owned by a terrorist). 
These meetings and communication interactions were vital to the group’s 
decision cycle and to the information-based decision process that was 
occurring within the specific terrorist network; and 
• All of the points mentioned above occurred continuously through time. 
Thompson (1967) suggests a typology of three types of interdependence and 
coordination. When each member of the group performs a task that is not dependent on 
any other task, and the overall project completion is the sum of the required tasks, then 
the tasks are pooled interdependent. When, in addition to pooled interdependence, the 
tasks are performed in sequential order where task B is performed after the completion of 
task A and task A is not dependent on task B, then the tasks are sequentially 
interdependent. When, in addition to sequential interdependence, the outputs of each task 
become the inputs of other tasks, then the tasks are reciprocally interdependent. Different 
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types of coordination manage each type of interdependence. Pooled interdependence is 
managed by coordination by standardization, which is the establishment of rules and 
procedures according to which the members operate. Sequential interdependence is 
managed by coordination by plan, where a schedule is established for the members’ 
actions. Finally, reciprocal interdependence is managed by coordination by mutual 
adjustment, where members coordinate based on environmental, individual and group 
characteristics. With an increase of uncertainty in the environment, members tend to rely 
on coordination with mutual adjustment.  
A terrorist attack appears to be divided in distinct sequential tasks in the abstract 
(e.g., plan, finance, get the explosives, train, and execute), but closer examination of the 
work performed by terrorist networks implies that the tasks required to perform an attack 
are reciprocally interdependent (e.g., the output of planning the attack affects the input of 
financing the attack and vice versa). This thesis examines the tasks performed before the 
Madrid terrorist attack, which were reciprocally interdependent. 
Thompson (1967) suggests, “Organizations seek to place reciprocally 
interdependent positions tangent to one another, in a common group which is (a) local 
and (b) conditionally autonomous.” Terrorist groups that exist in different countries 
worldwide, after 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, operate autonomously at a 
local level (Benjamin & Simon, 2005). Therefore, the view of locally autonomous 
terrorist networks keeps pace with Thompson’s proposition.  
Thompson (1967) also proposes that ‘“Organizations with reciprocal 
interdependence not contained by departmentalization rely on task-force or project 
groupings to accomplish the remaining coordination.” When terrorist networks have 
members with low levels of experience and different backgrounds (the Madrid terrorist 
cell) (Wright, 2004) there is not sufficient homogeneity to departmentalize a terrorist 
attack. Therefore, the networks rely on task forces or project groupings to accomplish the 
required coordination for a specific project, which, in the Madrid case, was to perform a 
bombing attack.  
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According to Galbraith (1977), individuals with low levels of formalization can 
outperform members with high formalization when they operate under conditions of high 
uncertainty. Also, experience is a key factor in the group’s performance. Highly 
experienced members produce fewer exceptions and errors than the inexperienced ones in 
either stable or unstable environments. The Madrid terrorist network had members with 
low formalization (Benjamin & Simon, 2005). The network did not have distinct jobs for 
each member, and the members were characterized as “amateurs” since none had 
participated in any terrorist training camp or had performed terrorist attacks in the past 
(Haahr-Escolano, 2005). All these theoretical propositions constitute a basis for the 
Agent Based Modeling manipulations described in the research design in Chapter IV.  
D. COMPUTATIONAL ORGANIZATION THEORY  
Computational organization theory focuses on computations and simulations of 
complex organizational models that cannot be analyzed completely with quantitative or 
qualitative conventional research techniques (Carley & Prietula, 1994). Computational 
tools are designed to simplify a complex real world problem. If the problem can be 
simplified without losing any of its key elements, then the tool is of some value. If the 
problem cannot be simplified appropriately with the available tool, then the results will 
be inaccurate (Miller & Page, 2007). Hence, research performed with computational tools 
must be question driven and not tool driven, because not all questions can be answered 
with all computational tools (Burton & Obel, 1995). In this thesis, POW-ER software was 
carefully selected since it provides insights about the contingencies that affect the process 
of performing a terrorist attack based on the Madrid bombing case study.  
According to Simon (1996) and Eipstein (1999), computer-based computational 
models generate virtual environments that imitate actions and behaviors of social life 
based on real world observations. The model’s simplicity is vital in every simulation. 
Every model must be complex up to the point where no critical attribute or element is 
excluded from the model (Burton & Obel, 1995). Some details from the real world can be 
ignored as soon as the main building blocks have been captured by the model (Miller & 
Page, 2007). Simon (1996) suggests that “we do not have to know, or guess at, all the 
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internal structure of the system but only that of it that is crucial to the abstraction.” Carley 
and Prietula (1994) do not refute the need for simplicity; however, they emphasize three 
reasons for adding the necessary complexity to a computational model. The first reason is 
that the problem may contain nonlinearities that cannot be represented in a different way. 
Second, some modelers use discrete variables that need to be analyzed with difference 
equations, and others use continuous variables that need to be analyzed with differential 
equations. Difference equations increase the realism of organizational simulation models 
because organizations, people and facts are discrete variables, but decrease the solvability 
of the model. Researchers should determine the complexity of their models based on the 
organization under study and the research question they try to answer. Third, agents are 
adaptive to other agents’ behavior; therefore, group behavior is “self-referential”. In this 
thesis, the baseline model of the Madrid terrorist cell, as it is presented in Chapter IV, is 
an abstraction that captures the key elements of the terrorist network, ignoring any 
information that is not crucial to the research question. 
There are mainly two approaches in computational modeling. The top down 
approach abstracts general properties from the real world and with the use of feedback 
loops examines the system’s behavior (Epstein & Axtell, 1996). The bottom up approach 
focuses on the interactions at the lowest level of the system (the individual level) which, 
by simulation, generates the emerging system behavior (Burton & Obel, 1995). Agent 
Based Modeling (ABM) is a bottom up approach that examines the system’s behavior 
based on the agents’ interactions. Each agent in ABM may follow its own behavior rules, 
adding complexity and realism to the model. ABM can be generated even if there is 
ignorance about the general behavior of the system. If the agents’ interactions are known, 
then the general properties of the system emerge with the simulation of these low level 
interactions (Miller & Page, 2007). Borshchev and Filippov (2004), after taking into 
consideration various simulation techniques (Agent Based Modeling, System Dynamics, 
Discrete Events and Dynamic Systems), suggest that, for systems that contain large 




enables to capture more complex structures and dynamics.” ABM is also powerful for 
small-scale systems when the overall behavior of the system is unknown but the 
behaviors at the individual level are known. This is a major reason why ABM was 
selected for this thesis.  
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III. THE MADRID ATTACK 
This chapter covers the background of the terrorist group that was responsible for 
the March 11, 2004, Madrid bombings, and the events that occurred from the day of the 
attack until the capture of the core members of the terrorist cell.  
A. THE MADRID TERRORIST CELL 
The appearance of terrorist groups in Spain dates back to the early 1980s. On July 
20, 1984, the Spanish police arrested an Iranian terrorist, a member of the terrorist group 
“Martyrs of the Islamic Revolution,” who was planning to bomb a Saudi plane in Madrid. 
That same year, the group “Islamic Jihad” killed citizens with Saudi ties inside Spanish 
territory; they were accused of bombing a restaurant in Torrejón in 1985. Several years 
later, the Spanish police captured members of a terrorist group with links to Hezbollah 
who were transporting a large quantity of explosives through Spain to France (Jordan & 
Horsburgh, 2005). All the attacks that occurred during the 1980s were performed by 
individuals, members of Jihadi cells who were neither Spanish residents nor citizens. 
However, the groups that emerged during the 1990s were composed primarily of Spanish 
residents. The most important of these groups were the Algerian Jihadi network and the 
Madrid bombing network. These two groups were not acting independently, since some 
individuals participated in both networks. This thesis examines the Madrid terrorist 
network and highlights its connections with other terrorist groups.  
After the 9/11 attacks, the Spanish police identified a terrorist cell in Spain that 
was connected with Al Qaeda. Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, aka Abu Dahdah, was 
believed to be the leader of this cell, which was part of the Algerian Jihadi network. 
Dahdah was captured in November 2001 (Haahr-Escolano, 2005; Green, 2005). 
According to the Spanish authorities, his arrest resulted in the disruption of the terrorist 
cell (Benjamin & Simon, 2005; Green, 2005). According to the Eleventh March (11-M) 




failed to understand the extent of the Jihadi terrorist network in Spain after the arrest of 
Dahdah in 2001, and they underestimated the threat of terrorist attacks by Jihadi groups 
on Spanish soil.  
After Dahdah’s arrest, the Moroccan Amer Azizi, who had close ties with 
Dahdah, started recruiting individuals, mainly of Moroccan origin who had some 
connections with Moroccan extremist groups or shared common beliefs about the “holy 
war” against the Westerners (Jordan & Horsburgh, 2005).  One of the first members to 
join the group was Sarhane Ben Abdelmajin Fakhet (known also as “The Tunisian”). He 
was the leader and coordinator of the Madrid bombings (BBC News April 4, 2004; 
Bennhold, 2004; Wright, 2004), and he had been planning the attack with Rabei Osman 
el-Sayed Ahmed (“Muhammad the Egyptian”) since 2003 (Benjamin & Simon, 2005). 
Fahket had lived in Spain for eight years, studied economics (Benjamin and Simon, 2005; 
BBC News, April 5, 2004) at the Autonomous University of Madrid (Bennhold, 2004) 
and also worked as a real estate agent (Wright, 2004).  
Muhammad the Egyptian was referred as the Architect of the attacks. He was an 
expert in bombs due to his service in the Egyptian Army as a specialist in explosives 
(BBC News, March 10, 2005; Wright, 2004); he was the only member of the terrorist cell 
with such expertise. Despite his previous military experience, he had not previously 
joined any Al Qaeda training camps or fought for the Jihad abroad. A conversation 
between him and another terrorist on the cell phone some days after the attacks was 
recorded; in this recording, he clearly stated that the Madrid bombings were his project. 
“I was ready to blow myself up, but they stopped me, and we obey God's will,” he said. 
“I had wanted a heavy burden, but I didn't find the means. This plan cost me a lot of 
study and patience. It took me two and a half years” (Sciolino & Horowitz, 2004). 
Jamal Ahmidan, Fakhet’s right hand man, was a Moroccan who was the cell 
commander of the terrorist group (BBC News, April 4, 2004; BBC News, April 5, 2004; 
Benjamin & Simon, 2005; Wright, 2004) and was involved in small drug smuggling 
(Jordan & Wesley, 2006) with the Oulad Brothers and Abdennabi Kounjaa (Benjamin & 
Simon, 2005; Wright, 2004). Ahmidan was also the cell recruiter: he had recruited 
Moroccans such as Kounjaa and the Oulad brothers, who had no prior terrorist 
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experience. Ahmidan did not plant any bombs on the day of the attack, but he rented a 
farmhouse outside Madrid where the bombs probably were assembled. His connections 
with criminals provided the group the necessary links to the bomb providers. Ahmidan 
exchanged drugs for explosives with a drug dealer, Jose Emilio Suarez Trashorras, who 
had friends who were miners and could steal some explosives from their workplace 
(Benjamin & Simon, 2005). Ahmidan received 200 kg of Goma-2 explosives and 
transported them to the rented farmhouse.  
The members of the terrorist group assembled the bombs by connecting the 
explosives with cell phones and detonators and placing them inside large handbags. What 
remains unknown is how the members of the group acquired the knowledge to build the 
bombs. They may have gathered this information through manuals or other sources found 
on internet sites, since the internet has become a virtual training camp for terrorist cells 
(Wiemann, 2006). Evidence supporting this view has not been found yet; therefore, this 
thesis assumes that the knowledge and the guidance for the bomb building process was 
provided by Rabei Osman el-Sayed Ahmed (Muhammad the Egyptian or The Architect), 
since he was the only member of the group who was an expert in bombs (Wright, 2004).   
Before the attacks, many of the members of the Madrid terrorist network were 
captured by the police for other crimes (e.g., drug smuggling) at different times, but they 
never were connected to any terrorist group. The Spanish authorities’ false belief that the 
terrorist network in Spain was neutralized after Abu Dahda’s arrest in 2001 resulted in 
the lack of correlation between terrorism activities and drug smuggling crimes. If that 
correlation had occurred earlier, the terrorist cell could have been delayed or even 
disrupted since it would not have had the funds to perform a bombing attack (Haahr-
Escolano, 2005). 
The Madrid terrorist group did not have any financial relations with any Al Qaeda 
operatives. The group was self-funded, and most of its resources came from drug 
smuggling activities (Benjamin & Simon, 2005; Wright, 2004). For the jihadists, outlaw 




Escolano, 2005). The whole operation’s cost was about $50,000, which is a very small 
amount considering the level of casualties and the effects the bombings had on Spain’s 
policy regarding its troops in Iraq (Benjamin & Simon, 2005). 
B. THE 2004 MADRID BOMBINGS 
On March 11, 2004, one of the largest terrorist attacks in the history of Spain 
occurred, causing the deaths of 191 people and wounding 1800 more (Jordan & Wesley, 
2006). The purpose of the attack, consistent with the fact that it occurred three days 
before the general elections, was to pressure the Spanish government to withdraw its 
troops from Iraq (Haahr-Escolano, 2005; Benjamin & Simon, 2005). The terrorists 
viewed the attacks as a message to the other countries that had troops in Iraq to either 
withdraw them or live under the fear of a similar attack on their own soil (Wright, 2004).  
The attacks occurred on four trains: three originating from Alcala de Henares (a 
village 18 miles northeast of Madrid) and one from Guadalajára. The first train departed 
from Alcala de Henares at 0604 GMT, and the other two left fifteen minutes apart (BBC 
News, April 4, 2004; Benjamin & Simon, 2005). At 0639 GMT, when the first train 
reached the Atocha station, three bombs exploded in three different wagons of the train. 
At the same time, another three bombs detonated on the second train, which was two 
minutes delayed, 500 yards from Atocha station. Ninety-three people were killed and 
hundreds were wounded in these two attacks (Benjamin & Simon, 2005). Two minutes 
later, two bombs detonated on the third train that had departed from Alcala de Henares. 
This attack occurred at the El Pozo station, which was the previous station on the train 
route before the Atocha station. This attack killed 70 people and wounded many more. If 
the train had not been delayed, there probably would have been more innocent victims, 
since a quarter million passengers pass through the Atocha station every day (Wright, 
2004). One minute later, a bomb exploded on the fourth train while it was passing 
through the Santa Eugenia station two stations away from the Atocha station (Benjamin 
& Simon, 2005). 
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All Spanish emergency services rushed to the bombing scenes to provide help to 
wounded citizens (BBC News, April 4, 2004). While the emergency rescuers were 
searching the train wreckage for survivors, they frequently came across various 
passengers’ belongings, which they delivered to the local police station after their sector 
search was over.  
Hours after the attack, the Popular Party Prime minister José Mariá Aznar 
declared that the Basque terrorist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) was responsible 
for the attacks, since they occurred three days before the general elections, and ETA had 
performed bombings on trains in the past (Haahr-Escolano, 2005; Benjamin & Simon, 
2005; Wright, 2004). According to members of the Popular Party, ETA wanted to bring 
chaos to the elections. However, early findings indicated that the methods used in the 
attacks were not similar to the methods used by the Basque terrorist group in the past. 
ETA’s attacks always came with a warning, and their targets were not innocent civilians, 
since this would have a negative impact on ETA’s popularity among the Spaniards 
(Wright, 2004). 
After the 9/11 attacks, a rental car that had flight manuals in Arabic was found 
near Boston’s airport. Based on this knowledge, the authorities immediately investigated 
a report about an abandoned Renault Kangoo outside Alcala de Henares station. Inside 
the van, the police found seven detonators and a tape with verses from the Koran in 
Arabic. This clue was a clear indication that Islamic extremists may have been 
responsible for the train attacks that had occurred earlier that day (Benjamin & Simon, 
2005). 
Twelve hours after the attack, a cell phone rang inside a bag that was found at the 
El Pozo station. The police opened the bag and, to their surprise, found that the cell 
phone was attached to two detonators that were connected to explosives. The bag also 
contained screws and nails in order to cause more deaths once it exploded. This was 
clearly a bomb that had failed to detonate. The police examined the SIM card that was 
inside the phone and obtained evidence that led to the arrest of five suspects: three 
Moroccans and three of Indian origin (BBC News, April 4, 2004; Benjamin & Simon, 
2005). The Spanish authorities interrogated the suspects and found connections with the 
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terrorist group that had performed similar attacks in Casablanca the previous May, killing 
forty-one civilians (BBC News, May 17, 2003). This Moroccan group had close ties with 
Al Qaeda, and the Spanish authorities were almost convinced that ETA had not 
performed the terrorist attack.  
The final confirmation that Jihadi groups were behind the attack came from a 
videotaped message in Arabic that was received on March 13, 2004, in which a man 
declared responsibility for the attacks. In the message he clearly said, “We declare our 
responsibility for what happened in Madrid ... It is a response to your collaboration with 
the criminals Bush and his allies ... There will be more if God wills it. You love life and 
we love death ... if you don't put an end to your injustices more and more blood will run.” 
(Wright, 2004)  
The terrorist cell did not use all of the explosives it had in its possession for the 
March 11, 2004, attacks. Bombs similar to those that were used for the March 11 attacks 
were found on the Madrid-Seville speed train on April 2, which indicated that the 
terrorists were planning to perform more attacks, but an unknown and unexpected event 
on April 2 ruined their plans (Benjamin & Simon, 2005; Wright, 2004).  
On April 3, 2004, the police had indications that the terrorists were in an 
apartment in a suburb of Leganes, an area south of Madrid. A police force surrounded the 
building and asked the terrorists to surrender. Instead, the terrorists blew themselves up, 
wounding a police officer in the process. The leader, the cell commander and five 
members of the terrorist cell were among the dead terrorists (BBC News, April 4, 2004; 
Bennhold, 2004).  
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IV. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This chapter initially covers the research method and frames the Baseline model, 
which is an abstraction based on real world data from academic papers and news articles 
about the terrorist cell that performed the 2004 Madrid attack. The research design then 
describes the Expert and the Hierarchical models, and the manipulations made for each 
model that was created based on the baseline model. In design terms, this chapter 
suggests a 3 x 2 factorial design with three different representations of a specific terrorist 
group (i.e., the Baseline, the Expert and the Hierarchical models), under two different 
mission-environmental contexts (i.e., Baseline and high counterterrorist conditions). 
A. RESEARCH METHOD 
Virtual Design Team (VDT) models are Agent Based Models, and the VDT 
program has been developing continuously accumulating research for more than two 
decades, building organizational models based on real world cases in order to examine 
their underlying organizational processes (Levitt et al., 1999). VDT modeling is based on 
an information processing view of organizations developed by Galbraith (1977), Simon 
(1976), and March and Simon (1958). According to Galbraith (1977), organizations are 
information processing systems that have a specific communication and information 
exchange infrastructure in which lower level information processors (individuals or 
teams) have predefined roles and accomplish specific tasks. These individuals or teams 
send information through some formal lines of communication and information exchange 
(e.g., telephone lines and mails) that, depending on the way they are organized (e.g., as 
Machine Bureaucracy or Adhocracy (Mintzberg, 1980)) and the sequence of the tasks 
that have to be completed, affect overall organizational performance. The actors’ 
information capacity is limited following the model of “bounded rationality” proposed by 
Simon (1976). Hence, the VDT models can predict the performance of alternative 
organizational configurations that perform a specific task (Carley & Prietula, 1994).  
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The VDT models are agent-based representations, exploring the organization’s 
aggregative behaviors using the bottom up approach. So, by simulating the micro-level 
organizational behaviors (individual actors or groups), the researcher can use simulation 
to explore the aggregative effects on the macro-organizational level (Levitt et al., 1999). 
Figure 1 illustrates the information processing view of the work accomplished by an actor 
who is part of an organization and performs specific tasks while communicating with the 
other members. The actor’s “In Tray” represents the inputs that are provided to the actor. 
These inputs can be the direct work that has to be performed for some tasks, meetings to 
attend, or even communications requests from other actors. The actor performs each task 
sequentially; therefore, he proceeds to the next task after the previous one has been 
completed. The “Out Tray” represents the outcomes that emerge from a specific actor. 
These outcomes can be the completion of a specific task, attendance at a meeting, or 
communication with another actor. The way an actor manages his inputs in order to 
generate the outcomes depends on his acquired skill level, the existing backlog, and the 
number of communications that are received from other actors. The actor’s outcome will 
vary, depending on how much the actor’s skill matches the skill required for a specific 
activity. Of course, as was mentioned before, the work backlog and the number of 
communications from other actors can affect the outcome since these tasks divert the 
actor’s attention.   
 
 
Figure 1.   The view of organization structure with the actors and the tasks (After: 
Nissen & Levitt, 2004) 
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The VDT modeling program has been extensively validated over the years by 
using fieldwork data in order to create the simulation models that represent the 
organizations under examination. Studies in various fields of industry, such as power 
plant construction (Christiansen, 1993), aerospace (Thompsen, 1998), software 
development (Nogueira, 2000) and healthcare (Cheng & Levitt, 2001), have been 
conducted with the use of VDT simulation, emphasizing its applicability in the real 
world. The models are created with the use of information possessed by the organization 
at the starting point of the period under examination. Then the generated behavior from 
the simulation is compared with the actual real world data and is provided to the 
researchers by the organization’s managers. If the computational results are similar to the 
real world data, then the model can be characterized as a “good” abstraction of reality and 
can be used for further analysis. This process is called “backcasting,” and it is a docking 
technique used by the VDT in order to validate the generated models (Kunz et al., 1998). 
Backcasting has been used extensively by researchers (Christiansen, 1993; Thompsen, 
1998; Cheng and Levitt, 2001). This thesis examines the March 11, 2004 Madrid 
bombings by using the method of “backcasting” in order to develop the baseline model. 
This thesis follows all the stages of “backcasting” except from the last comparison stage; 
data could not be provided by the terrorists since most of them are dead and the living are 
hard to reach. The studies that have been performed analyzing the terrorist network that is 
responsible for the 2004 Madrid bombings (Jordan and Horsburgh, 2005; Rodriguez, 
2008) are used instead.  
In order to summarize the VDT modeling structure and emphasize the value of 
the knowledge created with the use of this computer simulation, it is useful to represent 
VDT as an Inquiring System (Mitroff & Murray, 1993; Mitroff, 1995). Figure 2 
illustrates Mitroff’s Inquiring System. Inquiring Systems are systems that create “new 
knowledge” based on some process, given certain inputs. The main components of an 
Inquiring System are the inputs, the process that receives the inputs and generates new 
knowledge, the outputs or the new created knowledge, and the guarantors for the inputs 




Figure 2.   Mitroff’s Inquiring System 
The inputs for the VDT model are the organizational structure, the activities 
performed by the members of the organization, the process description of the project 
under examination, the actors and the communication lines among them (including 
coordination and rework links) (Kunz et al., 1998). In this thesis, the inputs are provided 
after extensive research through academic papers and articles that describe or  analyze the 
Madrid bombing attacks. Hence, the guarantors for the inputs are the cross-validated real 
world data that provide information for the specific case study. The process is the VDT 
simulation model and the guarantor for the process, as mentioned above, is the research 
conducted with the VDT simulation for over two decades in various industries that 
provides external validity to the simulation software. The output of VDT comprises 
quantitative measures of the required coordination, rework, total work, and others, 
including the various kinds of risks (communication, functional and project risk), 
required for project completion. These measures indicate how the inputs affect the 
outcome and provide useful insights about the effect of different contingency factors on 
project completion. In this thesis, the outcome also proposes counterterrorist policies that 












B. THE BASELINE MODEL  
The POW-ER Agent Based Modeling application used in this research is version 
3.5b, and represents a continuation of development (see Nissen and Levitt 2004; Looney 
and Nissen, 2006; Nissen, 2005a; Nissen, 2005b) that has its roots in the VDT research 
program. Any bugs or errors that may be inherent in POW-ER 3.5b are controlled and 
applied consistently across all models. Hence, even though some results may have some 
errors, these errors apply to all models, leaving unaffected the relative comparison that is 
of essence in this thesis.  
 
 
Figure 3.   Madrid Cell Baseline Model  
Figure 3 illustrates the baseline model of the terrorist network that performed the 
2004 Madrid terrorist bombings. Behind each object in the baseline model, either an actor 
or a task, are a number of model parameters that are set to describe the nature and the key 
attributes that create the overall behavior of the system. Most of these parameters are set 
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to “normal” levels based on organizations that have been examined in the past (Jin & 
Levitt, 1996; Levitt et al., 1999; Nissen & Levitt, 2004; Nissen & Leweling, 2007). The 
structure of the Madrid network was decentralized and could be characterized as an 
Edge-like structure (Alberts & Hayes, 2003). The Edge (Alberts & Hayes, 2003) is an 
organizational archetype with particular applicability in the C2 domain (see Nissen, 
2005a, Orr & Nissen, 2006). The Edge shares similarities with the Adhocracy (e.g., 
coordination by mutual adjustment, small unit size, many liaison links throughout, 
selective decentralization), Professional Bureaucracy (e.g., low vertical specialization, 
high training and indoctrination, market and functional grouping), and Simple Structure 
(e.g., low horizontal specialization, low formalization). The Edge organization also 
demonstrates several key differences, and it does not correspond cleanly with any single 
archetype. Key to Edge characterization are decentralization, empowerment, shared 
awareness and freely flowing knowledge, which are required to push power for informed 
decision making and competent action to the “edges” of organizations (Alberts & Hayes, 
2003), where they interact directly with their environments and other players in the 
corresponding organizational field (Scott, 2001). Therefore, some general parameters 
(e.g., noise and communications probability) were set to “normal” levels based on 
previous research about terrorist groups with Edge and Hierarchical structure, that was 
conducted with the use of POW-ER software at a theoretical level (Nissen & Leweling, 
2007). The model has a start and a finish point (on the far left and right of the figure). 
Each run begins at the start point and ends when it reaches the finish point. Using a 
Monte Carlo approach, each scenario is run 100 times.  
The actors of the terrorist group (human figures) represent either an individual or 
a group of people. The actors’ names are mentioned based on their roles. A representation 
of the actors with their real names based on the Madrid case study was avoided: it is out 
of the scope of this thesis since the focus is not on the individuals themselves. On the 
other hand, each actor has the attributes of the participant or the group that participated in 
the Madrid terrorist network. For example, Fakhet, who was the leader and coordinator of 
the cell, is represented as an individual who has a team-leading role. The financers are a 
group of four individuals composed of Jamal Ahmidal, the Oulad Brothers and 
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Abdennabi Kounjaa (BBC News, March 10, 2005; Benjamin and Simon, 2005). The 
baseline model’s network is compared with existing Social Network Analysis networks 
that have examined the 2004 Madrid terrorist network. Even though the representation is 
different and the analysis is made with a completely different method, as described in 
Chapter II, the SNA networks and the baseline model network have the same number of 
core participants, and the description of each member is identical (Jordan and Horsburgh, 
2005; Rodriguez, 2008). Hence, the empirical representation of the actors and their 
attributes used in the baseline model are consistent with the existing data from SNA 
academic papers.  
The boxes that are directly connected with the actors represent the tasks 
performed by the actors. The tasks are sequentially interconnected, some in series and 
some in parallel. Initially, the attack is planned by the architect and the leader, and 
afterwards the tasks are performed in three parallel branches that have the same amount 
of total work. The top branch is composed of the finance and weaponize (buy and 
assemble the explosives) tasks. At the same time, team members train for the attack, 
meaning that they identify targets and check the train routes; this forms the second 
branch. During the same period, the leader has a coordinating role overseeing the 
progress of the plan, which forms the third branch. When the attack is ready (represented 
by the milestone “attack ready”), team members execute the attack. The time periods 
needed for the completion of each task were impossible to select with accuracy, since 
most of the members of the cell committed suicide approximately one month after the 
attacks (BBC News, April 4, 2004). According to Benjamin & Simon (2005), Sahrane, 
who was the coordinator of the attack, stopped showing up for work by the fall of 2003. 
Moreover, on October 19, 2003, bin Laden released two videotapes in which he prompted 
Jihadi groups for an attack against the countries that participated in the war in Iraq, such 
as Spain, Poland, Italy and Japan. A Spanish official suggested that the cell started the 
planning of the attack the day after the messages’ release (Benjamin & Simon, 2005). 
Therefore, the total “project’s” time was set to four months in our models. The 
coordinator was performing his task during the whole four month period, except during 
the execution phase; Sahrane (the coordinator) stayed at the farmhouse (the place where 
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the terrorist met and assembled the bombs) the day of the attack and was not part of the 
“execution phase group.” In addition, the terrorists acquired the explosives in January 
2004 (Benjamin & Simon, 2005) and had only the next month (February 2004) to 
assemble them. Therefore, the finance and weaponize task was set to one month each. 
Hence, the first two months were devoted to planning. The analysis of the network is 
performed comparatively; therefore, errors that may exist in the model’s task durations 




Application Experience Low 
Skill Level Low 
Task Uncertainty Medium 
Task Complexity Medium 
Rework Strength 0.10 
Centralization Low 
Formalization Low 
Team Experience Low 
Matrix Strength High 
Communication Probability 0.60 
Noise Probability 0.20 
Functional Exception Probability 0.15 
Project Exception Probability 0.15 
Organizational Levels 1 
Table 1.   The Main Parameters of the Baseline Model 
The key parameters of the baseline model are summarized in Table 1. According 
to Galbraith’s view of organizations as information processing systems, exceptions are 
situations in which an actor does not have the required information to accomplish a task, 
which normally requires him or her to go to a higher level in the hierarchy or to a 
knowledgeable person in order to handle the created exceptions. However, an exception 
may be handled or ignored. If it is ignored, it causes a decrease in the project’s (e.g., the 
terrorist attack) quality. Each task requires a skill that needs to be matched with the 
actor’s skill in order to generate as few exceptions as possible. Therefore, if an actor who 
performs a task has a high level of a specific skill that is required for the task (for 
 31
example, an expert on weapons is performing the “weaponize” task), then the task will be 
performed with few exceptions. Application experience, on the other hand, is the level of 
experience the actor has on the assigned task.  
The main distinction between application experience and skill level is that an 
actor may have a high level skill that matches the skill required for task completion, but 
have no prior experience with the execution of the specific task. In the Madrid terrorist 
cell, the financers had no prior experience with financing a terrorist act, so their 
application experience is set to low. In general, the design and the execution of the 2004 
Madrid terrorist attacks were not done by Al Qaeda operatives (Benjamin and Simon, 
2005). The Madrid terrorist cell had individuals who were Spanish residents, shared 
common ideas and beliefs about jihad among themselves and with Al Qaeda, but did not 
formally belong to the “Al Qaeda organization” (Haahr-Escolano, 2005). None of the 
members of the Madrid terrorist cell had been trained in any of Al Qaeda’s training 
camps in Bosnia, Afghanistan and elsewhere (Benjamin & Simon, 2005). The network 
was composed of “amateurs,” since the members of the terrorist cell had neither previous 
experience nor training to conduct terrorist acts (Jordan & Wesley, 2006). For this reason, 
the Application Experience in the baseline model was set to low for all members. The 
required skill levels for all actors were also set to low for the reasons mentioned above, 
except for the Architect (Muhammad the Egyptian), who was an expert in bombs and 
therefore had a high “weaponize” skill.  
Since the Architect was the only member of the group who had knowledge about 
bombs, the model has a knowledge link that starts from the actors who assemble the 
bombs and ends at the Architect. This knowledge link indicates the path that actors who 
encounter exceptions should follow in order to reach the appropriate actor who can 
manage the exceptions that are generated during the execution of the actors’ task.  
The level of task uncertainty indicates the amount of information that the actor is 
missing as he goes about completing a task, and task complexity represents the relative 
difficulty of performing a specific task. For the Madrid case study, the levels of 
uncertainty and complexity are set to medium since there are no indicators to justify a 
change of these values for the specific attack.  
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The coordination links (green lines among tasks) indicate that, in order to 
complete a specific task, actors have to communicate with other actors. For example, the 
team that is responsible for the bombs communicates with those who train for the attack 
and vice versa. The rework links (red lines), on the other hand, are unidirectional. An 
exception created at a specific task might generate rework for another task. For example, 
an exception created during the financing task might create rework at the planning task, 
since new parameters must be taken into account for the successful planning of the 
operation. Each rework link has an embedded value that characterizes the rework 
strength. Rework strength of 0.1 implies that 1 day of rework in the source task will cause 
0.1 day of rework in the target task.  
The level of centralization indicates which organizational level has the decision-
making responsibility within the organization. A low level of centralization suggests that 
all expect decision rights remain at the lowest levels of the organization. Similarly, a high 
centralization level indicates that all decisions are made at the highest levels of the 
organization. The centralization of the Madrid terrorist network is set to low because, 
even though the network had a leader and an architect, all decisions were made by the 
actors at the lowest level of the organization. The Madrid terrorist cell was a 
decentralized network that acted as a group focused on the completion of its project, the 
terrorist attack.  
Formalization, according to Organization Theory, is based on the degree to which 
work structures and job descriptions are rigidly defined within the organization. The 
formalization of the network is set to low because the members of the network did not 
have predesigned tasks and their jobs were not predetermined from the planning phase of 
the attack. The available open source data (academic papers and news articles) provide 
the opportunity to separate the network’s activities into explicit subtasks.  
Team experience is the experience the team has on the specific type of project. 
Even though all the members of the terrorist group had the same beliefs, shared the same 
ideas and had friendship or family ties, they had never performed a terrorist attack 
together. Therefore, their team experience is set to low. Matrix strength indicates the  
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tendency actors have toward coordination among horizontal lines. In the Madrid terrorist 
cell, members relied completely on lateral relations; therefore, the matrix strength is set 
to high.  
The communication probability of 0.6 indicates that 60% of the total amount of 
communications are successfully performed among actors. According to Kunz, et al. 
(1998), noise consumes actors’ time without contributing to performance. Therefore, a 
noise probability of 0.2 indicates that 20% of the actors’ total time is spent on things that 
are not related to the project. The parameters Functional Error Probability (FEP) and 
Project Error Probability (PEP) address two different aspects of environmental difficulty. 
FEP indicates the probability of organizations making errors and causing exceptions at 
the functional level, and PEP indicates the probability of organizations making errors and 
causing exceptions across functions that affect the whole project.  
The organizational levels indicate the vertical levels that exist within the 
organization. For example, Edge has one organizational level, Simple Structure and 
Professional Bureaucracy have two, and Machine Bureaucracy has three or more 
organizational levels. The values of rework strength, communication probability, noise 
probability, FEP and PEP presented in Table 1 are patterned in particular after relevant, 
previous work (Gateau et al., 2007; Nissen & Leweling, 2007) and the interested reader is 
directed to this previous work for more details. 
C. THE EXPERT AND HIERARCHY MODELS 
Even though the Baseline model does not capture the relations among the 
individual members of the group, such as family, occupational or friendship relations, it 
provides the opportunity to examine the structure and the workflows of the terrorist 
network that was responsible for the 2004 Madrid bombings. It allows us to develop 
variations of this model in order to answer the research question and generate suggestions 












Skill levels Low High Medium 
Application Experience Low High Low 
Team Experience Low High Medium 
Formalization Low Low High 
Centralization Low Low High 
Matrix Strength High High Medium 
Communication Probability 0.60 0.60 0.30 
Noise Probability 0.20 0.20 0.10 
Functional Exception Probability 0.15 0.15 0.05 
Project Exception Probability 0.15 0.15 0.05 
Organizational Levels 1 1 3 
Table 2.   Model Manipulation Variables 
The 2004 Madrid terrorist cell was composed of “amateurs” (Haahr-Escolano, 
2005) with low skill and application experience levels. The threat of amateur terrorists is 
examined in comparison with an “expert model” that substitutes experts for amateurs. 
The “experts” in the expert model have high skill levels that match the tasks’ required 
skills; for example, an expert on weapons is performing the “weaponize” task. Their 
application experience also is high, which indicates that they have performed the tasks 
repeatedly in the past. The team experience is set to high, indicating that the expert group 
had performed these terrorist tasks in the past as a team. All other model parameters are 




Figure 4.   Madrid Cell Hierarchy Model 
Despite the fact that many terrorist networks are decentralized and are not 
branches of the AQ organization, some appear to be locally organized as a hierarchy. 
Therefore, a hierarchical model is introduced, where the structure of the network is a 
three-level hierarchy. Figure 4 illustrates the Hierarchical model of the Madrid terrorist 
cell. The key attributes of both the actors and the tasks are the same as the baseline 
model. The total work performed in both the Baseline and the Hierarchical model is 
identical. The leader stands at the top of the hierarchy; the architect and the cell 
commander are the terrorist organization’s middle managers. The financers, weaponiers 
and followers operate at the lowest level of the organization and are subordinates of the 
cell commander. The values of the parameters presented in Table 2 for the Hierarchical 
structure are patterned after previous POW-ER models that characterized organizational 
hierarchies (esp. Looney & Nissen, 2006; Gateau et al., 2007).  
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D. THE COUNTERTERRORIST CONDITIONS 
The three models introduced above are tested under different “counterterrorist 
conditions.” In general, counterterrorist actions may lead to the destruction of a terrorist 
cell or to the arrest of terrorists that prepare a terrorist attack. This thesis examines the 
Madrid terrorist network, which was a “successful terrorist project”, where no member 
was captured before the execution of the attack. Therefore, in this thesis counterterrorism 
conditions are composed of three basic elements. The first is the noise probability, the 
second is the level of task uncertainty, and the third is the level of task complexity. The 
values of these parameters for the Baseline case were analyzed earlier in the chapter.  
 




Noise 0.20 or 0.10 (Hierarchy) 0.80 or 0.40 (Hierarchy) 
Task uncertainty Medium High 
Task complexity Medium High 
Table 3.   Baseline and High Counterterrorist Conditions 
High counterterrorist conditions occur when counterterrorist agencies perform a 
high level of counterterrorist acts in order to distract terrorist members from their prior 
tasks. Therefore, the noise probability is greater for high counterterrorist conditions. 
According to Sterman (2000), extreme input values give the opportunity to the researcher 
to observe with greater clarity and confidence the differences that occur at the outputs. 
Therefore, the noise probability value for the high counterterrorist conditions is set four 
times greater than the noise probability of the Baseline case. High counterterrorist 
conditions also imply that the terrorists will perform their tasks with greater uncertainty 
(have less information to complete the task) and the task itself will become more difficult 
(high task complexity). This manipulation aims to explore the effect that intense 
counterterrorist acts have on terrorist networks while they are planning to execute a 
terrorist act. Table 3 summarizes the differentiating variables under the two 
counterterrorist conditions.  
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 Baseline Model 










   
Table 4.   The 3 x 2 factorial research design 
To summarize, this thesis examines three different terrorist organizations under 
two different counterterrorist conditions, in order to provide insights about the network’s 
underlying structure. In design terms, it is a 3 x 2 factorial design with three different 
representations of a specific terrorist group (i.e., the Baseline, the Expert and the 
Hierarchical model), under two different mission-environmental contexts (i.e., Baseline 
and High counterterrorist conditions). The results of these comparisons are presented 
analytically in Chapter V.  
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V. RESULTS  
This chapter examines the simulation results of the various model manipulations 
presented in Chapter IV. Initially, a comparison is made between the Baseline model, 
which is composed of low skilled and inexperienced members, and the Expert model 
(EX), which is a representation of the baseline model with highly skilled and experienced 
members. Then the Baseline model is compared with the Hierarchical model. All 
comparisons presented are also tested under two different environmental conditions, the 
baseline (BCC) and high counterterrorist (HCC) conditions, in order to examine how 
different environmental conditions affect the models mentioned above. Finally, all 
models are compared holistically under the two different environmental conditions.  
The simulation results for all models are summarized in Table 5. We first 
compare the Baseline, the Expert and the Hierarchical model under baseline 
counterterrorist conditions then compare the same models under high counterterrorist 
conditions. The differentiations of the models’ variables are described in detail in Chapter 
IV.  The values in bold of Table 5 indicate the lowest value for each variable in the two 












Baseline Counterterrorist Conditions 
(BCC) 




Baseline  Expert (EX)  Hierarchy  Baseline Expert (EX)  Hierarchy 
Duration 
(days) 
404 197 425 408 198 458 
Rework 
(person-days) 
65 94 82 69 96 102 
Coordination 
(person-days) 
222 256 42 255 317 68 
Wait Time 
(person-days) 








0.75 0.20 0.75 0.75 0.20 0.73 
Project Risk 
(probability) 
0.71 0.71 0.56 0.72 0.71 0.55 
Table 5.   Simulation Performance Results 
A. BASELINE COUNTERTERRORIST CONDITIONS’ MODEL 
COMPARISON 
Beginning with the results of the Baseline model under Baseline Counterterrorist 
Conditions (BCC), that are reported in the second column of Table 5, the terrorist 
organization accomplishes its tasks in 404 days; this is a measure of organizational speed 
which is very important for performing a terrorist attack under time constraints. (The 
2004 Madrid attack had to be performed some days before the Spanish general elections 
in order to create a greater impact (Wright 2004)).  
For reference, although the exact duration of this “terrorist project” remains 
unknown, certain informed estimates vary from four months (a Spanish official suggested 
that the cell started the planning of the attack the day after the release of bin Laden’s 
messages at the end of October 2003 encouraging terrorists to attack Spain (Benjamin & 
Simon, 2005)) to thirty months (a terrorist claimed, “This plan cost me a lot of study and 
patience. It took me two and a half years” (Sciolino & Horowitz, 2004)). The simulation 
result of 404 days (i.e., roughly 14 months) is close to the mean of these estimates.   
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Continuing with Baseline results in the table, the level of rework (65 person-days) 
reflects the level of effort expended attending to exceptions and correcting errors that are 
made during the “terrorist project.” Coordination (222 person-days) reflects the level of 
effort expended for coordination between the various actors of the terrorist network. The 
26 person-days of wait time reflect the amount of time that actors spent waiting for 
decisions to be made and information to be provided.  
The communication risk of 0.61 indicates that 61% of the total communications’ 
volume that occurs among actors is likely to be ignored or addressed inadequately. 
Functional risk of 0.75 indicates that, on average, 75% of the exceptions that are created 
for a particular functional area (for example the planning task) are inadequately reworked 
or ignored by the actors. Finally, project risk of 0.71 indicates that, on average, 71% of 
the exceptions that are created across functional areas are ignored or inadequately 
resolved by the actors of the organization. According to Ramsey and Levitt (2005), 
project exceptions are related to the interface issues of the functional and knowledge 
areas of the project.  
For comparison, the Expert model requires only 197 days to accomplish the 
terrorist tasks. This is less than half of the time duration required in the Baseline model; 
therefore, the expert organization moves much faster than the Baseline. The Expert model 
also involves more rework (94 person-days). This is almost 50% more in comparison 
with the Baseline model and indicates that a greater number of exceptions and errors are 
corrected by the Expert organization. Coordination (256 person-days) is greater for the 
Expert organization also, since the organization’s actors need to coordinate more in order 
to rework more exceptions. Wait time in the Expert organization is 4; this is almost one 
sixth of the wait time for the Baseline organization. This occurs because actors that are 
connected with knowledge links in the expert organization do not have to wait long for 
experts to provide them with information, since they are experts themselves and the 
exceptions that are handled through the knowledge links are few.  
The communication risk is lower for the Expert organization (0.55) since the team 
experience is high in comparison to the low team experience of the Baseline organization. 
The large number of reworked exceptions also is reflected in the functional risk of the 
 42
Expert organization (0.20) which is almost one quarter of Baseline’s functional risk. 
Finally, project risk level (0.71) is approximately the same as the Baseline organization. 
Hence, even though the Expert model entails almost the same risk as the Baseline 
organization, it is faster than the Baseline model.  
For comparison with the Baseline, the Hierarchy requires roughly 21 days more 
time to accomplish its terrorist attack tasks and hence moves somewhat more slowly. 
This is consistent with results in other contexts (e.g., joint task force, see Gateau et al., 
2007; coalition mission planning, see Looney and Nissen, 2006; Computer Network 
Defense, see Koons et al., 2008). In comparison to both the Baseline and the Expert 
models, the Hierarchy is the slowest of all. The Hierarchy involves a greater level of 
rework (82 person-days) in comparison to the Baseline model, which indicates that a 
greater number of exceptions and errors are corrected by the Hierarchical organization 
than the ones reworked by the Baseline organization. On the other hand, the Hierarchy 
requires less rework in comparison to the Expert model. Coordination (42 person-days) is 
considerably less for the Hierarchy than for either the Baseline or Expert models, as 
actors without a hierarchical organization are required to coordinate abundantly and 
laterally. However, wait time (61 person-days) is almost two and a half times greater in 
comparison to the Baseline and fifteen times more in comparison to the Expert model, as 
actors in the Baseline and the Expert models do not have to wait for supervisors to make 
decisions or provide information.  
The communication and functional risks are comparable for both the Baseline and 
Hierarchy (0.61 vs. 0.60), indicating the immunity of these variables to structural change. 
As with the Baseline, however, the functional risk of the Hierarchy (0.75) is much greater 
in comparison to the Expert model (0.20), since more exceptions are reworked in the 
Expert model. Finally, project risk level (0.56) is appreciably lower for the Hierarchy. 
Hence, the Hierarchy entails less project risk in comparison to the other two models 
(Baseline and Expert models). 
Therefore, there is a set of strengths and weaknesses that characterize these 
models under BCC; these are summarized here. First, the Baseline model requires the 
least rework in comparison with the other two models. Moreover, the Baseline model is 
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faster and requires less wait time in comparison with the Hierarchical model. The 
Baseline model also requires less coordination in comparison with the Expert model. The 
weaknesses of the Baseline model are its high communication, functional and project 
risks. Second, the Expert model has the smallest project duration, wait time, and 
communication and functional risks in comparison to the Baseline and the Hierarchical 
models. The weaknesses of the Expert model are the high levels of required rework, 
coordination and project risk. Third, the Hierarchy requires the least coordination and has 
the lowest level of project risk in comparison with the Baseline and the Expert model. In 
addition, the Hierarchy requires less rework in comparison to the Expert model. The 
Hierarchy’s weaknesses are the project’s duration, wait time, and communication and 
functional risks.  
Hence, there is a set of tradeoffs that characterize these organization forms: to the 
extent that organizational speed is important. The Expert model appears to have an edge 
over the other two models, but to the extent that project risk represents a primary 



























Figure 5.   Project Duration, Risk and Required Coordination Comparison of the 




To illustrate this comparison it would be beneficial to take into account a key 
attribute of terrorist networks: the maintenance of a high secrecy level during the 
preparation and execution of an attack. When the actors, in order to accomplish a project, 
have to coordinate regularly, the secrecy of the project is put at risk. Therefore, in 
addition to the speed and project risk, coordination levels are of primary importance 
when examining terrorist groups. Figure 5 summarizes the project’s risk, duration and 
coordination levels under BCC. The total amount of coordination required for each model 
is represented by the size of each circle, which has the exact coordination value (in 
person-days) next to it. Hence, a terrorist group that is risk averse and wants to maintain 
high level of secrecy (low coordination level) is more likely to have a hierarchical 
structure, and a group that has limited time to perform a task, and risk or required 
coordination is not of main concern, is more likely to have a decentralized form (Expert 
or Baseline, depending on the members’ skill level).  
B. HIGH COUNTERTERRORIST CONDITIONS’ MODEL COMPARISON 
When the Baseline, the Expert and the Hierarchical organizations are tested under 
high counterterrorist conditions (i.e., high levels of noise, task uncertainty and task 
complexity) the outcomes are the following. First, in the Baseline model under high 
counterterrorist conditions (HCC) the total project duration increases by 4 days (to 408 
days), and the project duration of the Expert model remains almost the same (198 vs. 197 
days). Moreover, the project duration for the Hierarchical model increases by 33 days (to 
458 days) in comparison with the BCC. This differentiation between the two 
environments is affected by the different skill and application experience levels among 
the models, and the degree of change is a result of the model’s structure. The Baseline 
and the Hierarchical models’ actors have low skill and application experience levels and 
the Expert model’s actors have high skill and experience levels. Tasks with great 
uncertainty and complexity under an environment with greater noise levels “slow down” 
amateur actors but have almost no effect, in terms of project duration, on expert actors. 
The total amount of rework is slightly greater for the Baseline (increase of four person-
days) and the Expert (increase of two person-days) model and even greater for the 
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Hierarchical model (increase of 20 person-days) under HCC in comparison to BCC. The 
coordination is greater, in comparison with the BCC, for the Baseline (255 person-days), 
the Hierarchical (68 person-days) and the Expert (317 person-days) model. The wait time 
decreases slightly for both the Baseline (23 days) and Expert (three days) models but 
increases for the Hierarchy (84 days) model under HCC. The communication risk 
remains almost at the same levels for both the Baseline (0.61) and the Expert (0.56 vs. 
0.55) models and slightly decreases for the Hierarchical (0.56) model under HCC. The 
functional and project risks remain almost the same for all three models under both 
counterterrorist conditions, indicating that extensive counterterrorist acts do not affect 
these variables. So all models (Baseline, Expert and Hierarchical models) outperform 
under BCC in terms of speed and required amounts of rework and coordination.  
Therefore, there is a set of strengths and weaknesses that characterize these 
models under HCC. First, the Baseline model requires the smallest amount of rework in 
comparison with the other two models. Moreover, the Baseline model is faster and 
requires less wait time in comparison with the Hierarchical model. The weaknesses of the 
Baseline model are its high coordination level and its high communication, functional 
and project risk. Second, the Expert model has the smallest project duration, wait time, 
and communication and functional risks in comparison to the Baseline and the 
Hierarchical models. In addition, the Expert model requires less rework in comparison to 
the Hierarchy model. The weaknesses of the Expert model are the high levels of the 
required coordination and project risk. Third, the Hierarchy’s strengths are the small 
amount of coordination and the low levels of communication and project risks in 
comparison with the Baseline and the Expert models. The Hierarchy’s weaknesses are the 
project’s duration, required rework, wait time and functional risk. 
The results suggest that agencies that increase the counterterrorist activity 
(increased number of suspects’ arrests and investigation of suspicious locations that may 
be used as meeting places for terrorists) do not increase the project risk involved in a 
terrorist project for both expert (Expert model) and amateur terrorist groups (Baseline and 
Hierarchical models). Moreover, high counterterrorist conditions delay the terrorist 
network’s activities (Baseline, Expert and Hierarchical models) but the level of delay 
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depends on the terrorist group’s structure and members’ skill and application levels. HCC 
increase the Expert group’s project duration by one day (almost 0.5%) and the amateur 
group’s (Baseline model) project duration by four days (almost 1%). Therefore, higher 
counterterrorist conditions have almost no effect on the speed of decentralized groups. 
The hierarchy’s project duration increases by 33 days (an almost 8% increase). Moreover, 
high counterterrorist conditions have little effect on the speed of a hierarchical group. In 
addition, HCC increase the required amount of coordination by almost 15% for the 
Baseline model, 24% for the Expert model and 62% for the Hierarchical model. Hence, 
the secrecy level of hierarchical terrorist groups is greatly decreased when the group 
operates under HCC. Figure 6 summarizes the comparison of the three models  
(Baseline, Expert and Hierarchy) in terms of speed, project duration and required 
coordination. The required coordination is represented by the size of each circle, which 

























Figure 6.   Project Duration, Risk and Required Coordination Comparison of the 
Models Under HCC 
C. MODEL COMPARISON UNDER BOTH COUNTERTERRORIST 
CONDITIONS  
Figure 7 illustrates the three models (Baseline, Expert and Hierarchy) under two 
counterterrorist conditions in terms of speed and risk. The Expert model is the fastest of 
Baseline HierarchyExpert 
 47
all models under both counterterrorist conditions, and the Hierarchy under both 
counterterrorist conditions (0.56 for BCC and 0.55 for HCC) has the lowest level of 
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Figure 7.   Project Duration and Risk Comparison Under Both Counterterrorist 
Conditions 
To summarize, counterterrorist agencies should take into consideration the 
comparison of these three different terrorist configurations in order to understand their 
attributes and behavior under the two different counterterrorist environments. The 
organizational structure with greater speed is the decentralized terrorist network 
composed of experts, but when either the secrecy level or the project’s risk is of main 
concern, the terrorist network with a hierarchical structure has an edge over the other two 
decentralized models. Therefore, counterterrorist agencies should focus primarily on 
decentralized terrorist networks (especially the ones composed of experts) when there are 
indications that a “terrorist attack project” might be planned and executed under tight 
time constraints. In addition, when time is not of primary concern for terrorist groups, but 
the maintenance of low levels of risk and coordination are, the hierarchical configuration 














When both secrecy and risk are of main concern to terrorists, and the terrorist 
group has a decentralized structure (based on information from intelligence sources), the 
terrorist groups composed of amateurs have an edge over a group composed of experts. 
Therefore, counterterrorist agencies should focus also on “amateur” groups because, even 
though the members of these groups lack skill and experience, they have shown in the 
past that they are capable of performing terrorist attacks (i.e., the 2004 Madrid train 
bombings).   
Counterterrorist agencies should also take into consideration the fact that, in 
general, high counterterrorist conditions do not affect the project risk levels of the 
terrorist’s project. In addition, under HCC, the required coordination among the members 
of decentralized terrorist networks (in both Baseline and Expert models) increases. In 
addition, the required level of coordination among hierarchical members increases 
significantly. Therefore, extensive counterterrorist conditions affect the secrecy level of 
all groups and especially of hierarchical configured networks. Moreover, the project 
duration of the hierarchical network increases by almost 8%. The Expert model’s project 
duration remains almost the same and the Baseline’s project duration increases almost by 
1% within HCC in comparison with BCC. Thus, HCC affect the speed of hierarchical 
networks more than it affects the speed of decentralized networks. Hence, groups 
configured hierarchically are more “sensitive” to high counterterrorist conditions in 
comparison to decentralized terrorist networks. The conclusions, limitations and future 




The understanding of terrorist networks is of main concern for governments, 
especially in the last decade, since major terrorist attacks, such as 9/11, the 2004 Madrid 
attack and the 2005 London attack, have changed people’s view of security on their own 
soil. By implementing counterterrorist policies, governments try to safeguard their people 
and interests and thwart the terrorist cells that put them in danger.  
Terrorism is a not a form of conventional warfare between states (e.g., World War 
II, Cold War) but a war between states and networks. Terrorism is not a regional 
phenomenon but a threat that exists at a global level (Robb, 2006). Terrorism is a 
network of networks that operates in a decentralized manner (Magouirk, et al., 2008). 
Bell (2002) suggests that thwarting terrorism requires a policy focusing on the fact that 
terrorism relies on commitment, so “loss of faith, the imposition of reality, and changing 
times can erode its strength.” Brafman and Beckstrom (2006) similarly suggest that 
decentralized networks can be disrupted if their members lose the motivation that was the 
driving factor for them to join the network in the first place. On the other hand, terrorist 
networks are composed of individuals who can not be easily identified by the 
counterterrorist agencies, and this makes Bell’s recommendation even more time 
consuming. Therefore, in order to analyze terrorist groups, counterterrorist agencies use 
various methods that help them understand terrorist groups in the short term, such as 
Social Network Analysis (SNA). 
One of the uses of SNA methodology is to understand the relationships within 
terrorist networks (Hassan, 2007; Mccartan et al., 2008; Magouirk et al., 2008; Jordan et 
al., 2008). SNA is based on Network theory and examines the connections and 
interactions among individuals or groups based on common patterns of friendship, 
occupation, ethnicity, or any other pattern that is of interest to the researcher (Newman, 
2003). The limitation of this approach is that it does not examine the structure and the 
workflow of the network for a specific activity (e.g., a bombing attack) and the types of 
interdependencies (sequential, reciprocal or pooled) that exist among the tasks. In 
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addition, it requires the identification of the individuals that compose a terrorist network, 
a task that is almost impossible to be performed before a terrorist attack or another 
incident.  
Conceptual Simulation Models, using Agent Based Modeling, have been used to 
represent terrorist networks as business process and provide insights to counterterrorism 
policy makers (Leweling and Nissen, 2007). These computer-based models analyze 
terrorist networks primarily through the lens of contingency theory. This thesis examines 
the structure and the attributes of the terrorist network that was responsible for the 2004 
Madrid bombing attack. It uses Agent Based Modeling to analyze the roles, activities and 
interdependencies of tasks and actors within the network, something that is not feasible 
through the use of Social Network Analysis. This approach generates new insights 
regarding the interdependencies of tasks related to a bombing attack, and examines how 
such a “project” could be slowed down if not disrupted. 
The research design initially captures the Baseline model, which is an abstraction 
based on real world data from academic papers and news articles about the terrorist cell 
that performed the 2004 Madrid attack. The Baseline model is compared with SNA 
networks that represent the 2004 Madrid terrorist group, indicating the common general 
attributes that are derived from both models. The Baseline model represents a network of 
“amateurs,” since its members had no previous experience with terrorist acts or any clear 
ties with the Al Qaeda network (Jordan and Wesley, 2006). 
Then the Baseline model is compared with the Expert model, which is a 
representation of the Baseline model with highly trained and experienced members, and 
the Hierarchical model, which is a representation of the Baseline model with a 
hierarchical structure. This comparison is made to examine how different contingency 
factors affect the preparation and execution of a terrorist bombing attack. All models and 
comparisons are further examined under high counterterrorist conditions in order to test 
the networks’ resilience when counterterrorist agencies increase the intensity of suspect 
arrests, investigations and surveillance.  
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All cases are simulated using POW-ER v.3.5b software, which is an Agent Based 
Model. The comparative results from the various tests mentioned above elucidate 
important insights into terrorist networks, suitable for advice to counterterrorist policy 
makers. Initially, terrorist organizations face a set of tradeoffs: to the extent that speed is 
of main concern, the decentralized terrorist network composed of experts represents the 
sharpest organizational form, but when either project risk or the required amount of 
coordination is of main concern, the terrorist network with a hierarchical structure has an 
edge over the other two decentralized structures. Therefore, counterterrorist agencies 
should take into consideration that, when time is not of main concern to terrorist 
organizations, hierarchical terrorist networks are able to perform an attack with the 
lowest level of project risk, maintaining at the same time the highest levels of secrecy. On 
the other hand, when it is known that terrorist networks are planning to perform an attack 
under time pressure, decentralized terrorist networks should be regarded as a primary 
threat. Hence, counterterrorist agencies, based on their intelligence sources about the 
terrorists’ view of time, secrecy and project risk, could derive the possible structure of a 
terrorist network and conduct counterterrorist acts accordingly.  
Moreover, high counterterrorist conditions do not affect the project risk of the 
terrorist’s project. This applies to both hierarchical and decentralized terrorist networks. 
Hence, counterterrorist agencies should consider this limitation when they plan 
counterterrorist acts and consider it when they perform a cost benefit analysis for their 
counterterrorist policies.  
In addition, extensive counterterrorist environments affect the secrecy level of all 
groups and especially of hierarchical configured networks. When agencies conduct 
extensive counterterrorist acts, the terrorists’ secrecy level decreases. Even though HCC 
have no effect on project risk, they increase the required coordination among terrorists. 
This is an additional finding that counterterrorist agencies should take into consideration.  
The project’s duration of the hierarchical network also increases under HCC.  The 
Expert model’s speed remains almost the same and the Baseline’s speed increases 
slightly within HCC in comparison with BCC. Hence, groups configured hierarchically 
are more “sensitive” to high counterterrorist conditions in comparison to decentralized 
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terrorist networks. Agencies should perform counterterrorist acts extensively when they 
face hierarchical terrorist groups since these actions decrease the network’s speed and 
secrecy level. Counterterrorist agencies should have in mind that HCC have almost no 
effect on the decentralized terrorist network’s speed and project risk but increase the 
required amount of coordination; therefore decrease the project’s secrecy level. 
In addition, decentralized (Edge-like) terrorist organizations face a set of 
tradeoffs: to the extent that organizational speed is important, a group composed of 
experts has an edge over a group of amateurs, but to the extent that risk represents a 
primary concern, both organizations appear appropriate. When, in addition to risk, the 
“project’s” secrecy is of main concern, decentralized terrorist groups composed of 
amateurs have an edge over a decentralized terrorist group of experts. Therefore, 
counterterrorist agencies should focus also on “amateurs” because these groups may 
perform large-scale terrorist attacks (i.e., the 2004 Madrid train bombings).   
This thesis has limitations that should be taken into consideration and delimit the 
generalization of this thesis. First, the Baseline model is an abstraction of the 2004 
Madrid terrorist group. The Baseline model contains the key elements that are necessary 
for this study, excluding others that are of no central interest (Simon, 1996). Therefore, 
this model is not an exact imitation of reality, but rather an abstraction that focuses on 
specific areas of interest. Second, the results of this study are derived from the 
examination of a unique case study, the 2004 Madrid bombing attacks. According to Yin 
(2002) a cross examination of at least three case studies is necessary for theory 
development, followed by two more relative case studies for the validation of the derived 
theory. Therefore, the results from this case study should be compared with other similar 
studies in order to generalize counterterrorist suggestions and propositions. Third, in this 
thesis counterterrorist conditions are defined in terms of noise, task uncertainty and task 
complexity. Moreover, this thesis examines the 2004 Madrid bombings, which was a 
“successful” terrorist project, where no member of the group that is responsible for these 
attacks was captured before the attacks. Therefore, this thesis does not examine the 
underlying structure of a terrorist network that failed to perform an attack because of 
counterterrorist actions. Future research on “unsuccessful” terrorist attacks and the cross 
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comparison with “successful” ones would broaden our understanding of terrorist 
networks and the effect that counterterrorist acts have on them. Finally, the method of 
“backcasting” used in this study suggests that senior managers of the organization under 
study should inform the researchers whether or not their simulation outcomes are similar 
to those observed in reality. In this thesis, this was not possible since most of the 
members of the 2004 Madrid terrorist group have either died or are isolated in high 
security prisons. Instead, Social Network Analysis papers, along with newspaper articles 
and books that focused on the 2004 Madrid attack, were used to compare the Baseline 
model with the SNA models. 
Using this thesis as a baseline, future research could examine terrorist networks 
that were responsible for other attacks, such as 9/11, the 2003 Bali attacks, and the 2005 
London attacks. Such additional case studies can generate data and propositions that 
could be cross compared for the generation of more generally applicable counterterrorist 
propositions. Moreover, a similar approach could be used for the examination and 
analysis of other events that are performed by small groups, teams or even nations, taking 
into account that the researcher should be in a position to represent these groups in an 
organizational form performing specific tasks.  
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